Referat Explanation Of Cognition In Cognitive Science
Mai jos puteti citi fragmente din
Referat Explanation Of Cognition In Cognitive Science si de asemenea puteti face
Download Referat Explanation of cognition in cognitive scienceCiteste fragmente din Referat Explanation Of Cognition In Cognitive Science
Explanation of cognition in Cognitive Science
A review of Vacariu et al s explanation of cognition involved in "Toward
a very idea of representation"
ABSTRACT. In this article I reproduce and examine some aspects of
Vacariu et al explanation of cognition. I conclude that their
explanation of cognition is not a complete one. I try to propose some
alternative explanations toward a complete explanation of every posible
cognition and to emphasize that the task of philosophy, as discipline
included in Cognitive Science, is to find the necessary and sufficient
conditions of every posible cognition. In final, I try to criticize the
idea that cognition can be only representational.
There is a cognitive arhitecture with a hierarchy of levels of
existence. Vacariu et al has considered that cognition cannot be
explanated by a single level. Arguments:
-the emergency of the primitives of one level from the primitives of
previous level.
- bidirectionality of cognitive processes; bidirectionality, wich is for
Vacariu et al one of the most important ideas, is the continuous
circular causation wich exist between conceptual and neural levels: the
changes wich appear at the conceptual level involve changes at neural
level and vice-versa.
Because of bidirectionality it is imposible to be explanated cognition
using a single level, either by conceptual level like Fodor or by neural
level as Churchlands.
But as has been sad previous, there is a cognitive arhitecture, and the
conceptual level must to belong to its levels of existence, not to some
metaphysical level. In the case of human cognitive arhitecture what is
the diference between neural and conceptual levels ? In this case CNS
must to be seen in levels. Its lower neuronal level maybe is the
singular neuron level. Than, conceptual level must be situated, in acord
with Vacariu et al, at higher level of compositionality and activity.
But, there is no clear evidence that Churchlands would be reduced the
conceptual level until at the singular neuron level.
The level of description that is proper to symbolic paradigm is
conceptual: descriptive entities are simultaneous semantic symbols(they
refers to external objects) and syntactical symbols(operations on the
representations are manipulations of symbols). The level of description
that is proper to conectionist paradigm(cf.Smolensky) is subconceptual:
its descriptive entities are caled subsymbols because they are the
constituents of the symbols proper to symbolic paradigm. However,
operations are considered differently: subsymbols are manipulated by
numerical computations(vectorial additions in a vectorial space of
activation). Vacariu et al noted that maybe in one day, Churchlands
eliminativism, wich reduce the conceptual level at the neural level,
will win; but, the neural level can be eliminated in the favour of
cuantic level. Fodor and Phylysyn consider that conceptual level cannnot
be reduced at the neural level, because of representational character of
mental symbols.The representational character of mental symbols is an
argument against the reductionist program of theoretical unity of
science(Fodor and Phylysyn, 1988). I think that, there must be a
mereologycal dependence between levels and between the primitives at the
every level. But, this dependece does not mean necesarly that the
events from a higeher level emerge as mereological sums of the events
from the lower levels."Organization is a property wich cannot be reduced
to the properties of its parts, for the behavior of each part depends on
those of the others and on the aims of the whole"(Del Re, 1998). For
exemple, if we take one thousand of resistors and we try to conect them
in all posibile structures, we know that there is only one structure,
wich is total serial, in wich the total resistance, the event from
higher level, is the individual resistors resistances sum, or the
mereological sum of lower level events properties, but in structures
that involve paralel connected resistors, the total resistance is not a
simple sum of individual resistors resistance. As a kind of conclusion,
human neurons are not miniatural human brains.
At each level of analysis/explanation there are some primitives. At the
conceptual level the primitives are symbolic representations wich are
static and discrete. Contraparts of symbolic representations at the
neural level are the neurons activation paterns, but the corespondence
between the primitives of conceptual level and those of neural level is
not biunivoc. "...the structures from the higher levels of sistem are
rarely isomorphic, or even similar, to the structures of lower levels
of sistem"( Fodor and Pylysyn 1988, 63). Activations paterns are in
permanent motion and change. At the subconceptual level the primitives
are subsimbolic representations, and their content depend on the
network s processing capacities and on the environment in wich it
operate.
The relation between conceptual and neural levels
Merzenich and deCharms speaking about neural representations, affirm
that there is a representational perceptual costancy even at the neural
level, the activation pattern of the ensemble of neurons---from wich
emerge the perceptual representation--- is in continuos motion and
change." Representational relations between neural elements of a grup
can be isomorphic over the changes of activation patterns ... and
therefore
they can realize representational constancy"(Merzenich and deCarms
1996,66). Extending this idea Vacariu et al considered that at the
conceptual level we can speak of a representational constancy even if
the ensemble of neurons that corespond to it are in continuous changing.
Representations of conceptual level approximates the processes from the
neural level; the stability from conceptual level is the result of
this approximation. But I think that this stability about wich discuss
Vacariu et al is a relative one; it is rather a question of speed of
motion, at least at the level of the flux of thoughts; even at level of
contents of single concepts there are sometimes historical changes.
However, Vacariu et al stability is relative to some lower faster
changes. The rate of changes of those two flux of changes is different.
The changes at neural level are continuos, but there is a threshold of
changing; when this threshold is exceeded some modifications of
representations from the conceptual level appear. For exemple, in
connectionism, excitation or inhibition of a knot depend on the signals
wich are recepted from other knots; and, there is a threshold of the
activation function. If the value of a recepted signal is biger than the
value of threshlod function than the knot is activated, if no it is
inhibated. The activation state of a unity is determined by the total
input of this unity, relation between knots being more important than
unities taken separately. Vacariu et al consider that our cognitive
sistem and even our senses are determined by the our ecological recess.
For exemple, our body have the ability to feel a certain scale of
frequences when it is subjected to some repeted touch on a hand. Under a
threshold, touch seem to be discrete. Over this threshold, they appear
continuos. Relative to our cognitive sistem, crossing from one level of
distinctions(continuity-discontinuity, static-in motion,
stability-variability) to other one is duet by exceeding a threshold
determinated by our ecological recess. However, at the conceptual level
we can speak about a similarity interval in wich structures, states,
processes( inteligible as approximations of structures, states and
processes from the neural level) appear as identical, even if their
neural activation patterns are different. Speaking about this interval
of similarity, also, we should to take in consideration to type of
changes: one at the neural level, and other from environment: when the
changes of activation paterns exceed a certain threshold, some change
appear at the conceptual level, and when the environmental changes
attain a certain threshold, we can distinguish them sensorialy.
Human beings, as cognitive sistems, are open complex sistems,
organized in many levels. In acord with many authors, consider Vacariu
et al, behaviour is a self-organizing macroscopic structure wich appear
as a result of interactions between micro and macro scales of
organization. Or as it is put by Keijer, "behaviour is a multiple-scalar
phenomenon, involving the patterns of a variety of scales of
organization, is the result of interaction between pre-existing orders
from this sistems and consist in reciprocal modulation of neural, bodily
and environmental dinamics"(Keijer 1997, 204). Or more simply, behaviour
is the result of dinamical interaction between body, brain and
environment.
Vacariu et al consider that "cognition ...is the result of multiple
interactions between the levels of organism, and between every level and
environment."
Now, we should to question us if this explanations are complet or
sufficient.
If this explanations explain also human aging or digestion? What are the
sense of those interactions? What are their function? What are their
utility? What are the contents of those intercations? What are
epistemological and gnoseological value? These explanations are only
mechanical.
I consider that, this explanations are why-explanations, because they
use the phrase result . Jane Fay considered that, "every explanatory
practice must be understooded in the frame of a question-answer speech.
... why-questions are not the only type of questions wich are put in
science. However, I take explanation as being every answer wich carry
relevant information as an answer to every question exccept
if-questions"(Jan Faye 1999). Other complementary questions wich offer
alternative explanations are what-questions, when-questions,
where-questions, how-questions, for what-questions. Neither all the
body-environment interactions(for, exemple ROS in aging) nor all the
interactions from organism(for exemple, the senectogen influence of
psychical stress) are cognitive. If we want to explain cognition, we
must not only to synthetize the explanations offered by the main
explanatory paradigms from cognitive science but also to lead towards a
complete explanation of cognition, by offering the following types of
explanations, synthetized by Faye:
1. Causal Explanation wich appeal to the real cause of certain
phenomenon.
2. Nomical Explanation wich refer to the law of some phenomenon.
3. Functionalist Explanation wich refer to the real efect of some
phenomen, in the sense that a certain phenomenon is favorable or
suitable for reproduction or succesion of some individ or society.
4. Functional Explanation appeal at the real efect, but in sense that a
certain phenomenon is favorable for survival or cohesion of an individ
or society.
5. Intentional Explanation appeal at the intentioned efect of certain
phenomenon by refering to the literal sense of certain human action.
6. Interpretative Explanation appeal at the conscious or inconscious
intentioned efect of certain phenomen by refering to some metaphorical
sense of some human action, text, symbol.
I think that, a complet/integral understanding of cognition must to
offer a conjunction of the previous types of explanations. And this is
compatible with Cognitive Science wich is multidisciplinary domain. We
must to try to explain not only the human cognition or its artificial
simulations but every posible cognition. We must to find the necesary
and sufficient conditions of every posible cognition, not only of
terestrial or of living things cognition. Every cognitive arhitecture
have some properties wich depend on its unicity, and therefore they
connot be reproduced, they should not preocupate us.
On the other hand, a concept is not any stable representation.
Representations must to represent something, perceptions or experiences.
The condition of posibility of something to be a representation is it to
be in a representational relation with something that is representated.
Now, a representation cannot refer to world directly, it refer to
perception or to experience/experiences. Only sensors refer to the world
directly. But, a representation must to be a
re-presentation. A concept is a general notion; or an abstract
representation; it is not just a stable representation. A first order
concept must to be a general or abstract representation of a set of
perceptions or feelings or direct experiences. A second order concept is
a representation that is more abstract or general than an abstract
representation wich corespond to a first order concept. A concept must
to contain a minimal non-nul content. Therefore the stability of a
representation is not a sufficient condition for something to be a
concept.
A representation is any informational conscious content that is not of
first order, that is perceptual content or first order feelings. In this
sense memories are representations.
There cannot be a representation of future, because the future cannot
be re-presented. There can be informational conscious contents wich try
to anticipate the future state of the world. When we create something
new existent we do not
re-present anything. If there can be a cognition of a posible that
never existed before, there its imagination, either abstract or concret,
is not a
re-presentation. In the base of scientific laws we can imagine the the
future behaviour of some asteroids. We try to process all the human
experience and memory to understand univers and to predict its future
states, and for survival.
Other interpretation of the concept of representation is that in
conformity with wich a representation is a state of brain wich is about
something: about the the world or about some part/parts of it. But this
interpretation is too extended, because all experience is in relation
with world. Every sensorial experience is about some physical, chemical,
biological stimulus. But sensorial experience is direct, not a
re-presentation. A re-presentation must to be a meta-information; it
must to refer to some conscious first order information/content. A
conscious content/information can to be about some experiences from the
past, but it can be also an anticipation not of the future states of the
world but of the future perceptions of the world, in this sense it is
not refer to something from the past, it is not a re-presentation. I
tried to argument that not every mental content is re-presentational.
Re-presentations had been too extended interpretated.
Appear the folowing question: can we talk legitimate about a reduction
of re-presentations to memories?
References:
Faye J.: 1999, "Explanation explanated", in Synthese 120.
Vacariu G.,Terhesiu and Vacariu M.:2001, "Toward a very idea of
representation", in Synthese 129:275-295, 2001.
ì¥Â`
